Is the current legislative framework on copyright in the UK capable of sufficiently protecting the interests of copyright owners in the online music industry?

Note: One of my duties in the various places where I teach is to show students how to write essays – something most young people are not nowadays taught to do. What I like to do in class is to choose a question at random, discuss possible approaches, and then dictate an answer one paragraph at a time. Some of these answers are very short. Some amount to small dissertations. In this latter case, the students take turns at looking on-line for the information we decide is needed. It they cannot find it, I show them how to change the structure of what has already been written, or to strike out in a new direction.

It is a “writing masterclass” approach that makes use of my own strengths, and is often a welcome alternative to formal teaching. It fills up a long morning session. Everyone learns something, and the more attentive will improve their final grades by at least one step.

Here is an example of the finished product. Do not take it as a statement of personal opinion. It is an answer produced for a specific question, and it bears in mind what a possibly unknown examiner will appreciate, and what can be written to incorporate the sources found in class. SIG

PS – If anyone wants to engage my services as a teacher of these skills, please click on the image to the left. Though they are my niche subjects, Greek and Latin are not my exclusive focus as a teacher. I do much else besides.

PPS – If you are a student, and you have come across this in a frantic last minute search, I advise you not to copy and paste and submit. You will be found out in three clicks of a mouse. Examiners were not born yesterday.

Introduction

The purpose of this essay is to discuss whether, in the age of digital reproduction and downloads, British law can give adequate protection to the owners of musical copyrights. My discussion will raise further questions. These are: whether and to what extent there should be protection; how the law seeks to give protection; whether the law can give protection. I will, at the end, discuss whether copyright is needed.

Why Copyright?

At its most basic, the law of copyright is a bargain between creators and the public mediated by the coercive apparatus of the State. The consuming public has an obvious desire for new and original works of the human mind. It wants novelty. It wants to be entertained. It wants to be uplifted. It wants to be educated. It wants these things without restrictions of price and availability. If there is a public interest in a happy and a civilised people, there is a case for the freest dissemination of what the human mind has created.

Creators of these works, on the other hand, want to make as much money as they can from what they create. As such, they and their agents and publishers have an interest in restricting availability. They want to charge money. They usually also want some degree of artistic control. They want this for as long as possible. For example, the American author Mark Helprin argues for the idea of perpetual copyright, so that intellectual property can be sold or inherited and possessed forever just like any piece of land or other physical object. (Helprin, 2007) In fact, the Authorised Version of the Bible is a perpetual copyright of the British Crown. Also, Great Ormond Street Hospital Children’s Charity has a right to royalty in perpetuity in the United Kingdom, granted by s. 301 of the Copyright Designs & Patents Act (1988) (CDPA). This applies to stage productions, broadcasting and publication of the whole or any substantial part of the work or an adaptation of it in the United Kingdom.

As said, these competing interests are mediated by the State, and the product of this mediation is the law of copyright. However, even if law is a product of competing interests, these interests only become relevant if they are accepted as legitimate. For most of recorded history, no one seems to have regarded creators or their associates as having any legitimate right to benefit from their original works, and so there was no law of copyright. If, in the past few hundred years, this right has been accepted, it is because the right has been legitimised by various kinds of philosophical argument.

The Justifications of Copyright

There are four main justifications for copyright as a protection of original works. The first and perhaps the most influential is the “utilitarian” theory. (Fisher, 2001, p. 221) According to this, a regular supply of new original works is in the public interest. However, once created, an original work, especially perhaps of recorded music, is what the economists call a public good. No one can be excluded from its use. One person’s use of it does not prevent another from using it. (Landes & Posner, 1989, p. 325)

Now, musical works do not create and perform themselves. They are created by composers and performed by singers and instrumental players. These have usually been through a long and expensive course of training. Even if they have a purely natural talent, there is an opportunity cost, so far as they could be doing something else instead of creating or performing. There are creative artists who never set out to make money from what they do. The German composer Mendelssohn, for example, was born rich, and was in the habit of refusing the fees he was offered. (Newman, 1933, p. 1:166) Most need and expect to make money. Even those who make more money than they could ever spend – Madonna, for example, or Paul McCartney – still perform a socially useful function. Their great wealth is an incentive for others to try to imitate their success. The fees they earn also pay for a great superstructure of agents and promoters whose contribution is essential, and who certainly expect to be paid.

Then there is the technical aspect of music recording. This also is not a free good. The revolution in digital music was launched in 1982, with the introduction of the compact disk. (Shapiro, et al., 2012) The development costs were high. There was a high risk that a public already happy with records and tapes would ignore the new product. It required the pooled resources of Philips and Sony to take on the direct cost of development and the risk of failure. Part of their incentive was to make a lot of money from the sale of recorded music and the fees from licensing their technology to other music companies. Without the prospect of payback, these companies would not have made the necessary investment.

Therefore we have copyright. It turns public goods into public goods, and allows the rewards from exploiting this property to be shared among creators and publishers.

The second justification is “natural rights” theory. According to this, we own our minds and bodies, and we own property that we have appropriated from the state of nature by mixing our labour with it. This is a theory most notably associated with the English philosopher John Locke. (Locke, 1690) Where intellectual property is concerned, it has the advantage that original creations are products of the mind alone. There can be no argument over prior or other competing appropriations. (Gordon, 1993) Therefore, it is no argument that original works ought to be regarded as the property of their creator. They are the property of their creator, and it is the duty of lawmakers to give effect to this moral claim.

The third justification is the “personality” theory. According to this, an original work is part of its creator’s mind and nature, and the creator should be rewarded for sharing this with the rest of us. (Fisher, 2001, p. 9)

The fourth justification is the “social planning” theory. This is best expressed by a direct quote from Neil Netanel:

Copyright provides an incentive for creative expression on a wide array of political, social, and aesthetic issues, thus bolstering the discursive foundations for democratic culture and civic association. The second function is structural. Copyright supports a sector of creative and communicative activity that is relatively free from reliance on state subsidy, elite patronage, and cultural hierarchy. (Netanel, 1996)

These arguments tend towards the same end, of legitimising copyright. However, it is worth noting that the utilitarian theory has room for giving creators a limited period of protection. The others seem to indicate the legitimising of perpetual copyright. In practice, utility seems to have been the main choice of legitimising ideology for copyright. For example, Article 1;8(8) of the American Constitution gives Congress the power

To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries. (United States, 1788)

Let us now see how these principles are expressed in law.

The Law of Copyright in the United Kingdom

Copyright law began as a set of halting experiments in national legislation. Then the growth of trade and cultural exchanges between peoples raised the need for an international approach. The Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works was signed on the 9th September 1886 and came into force on the 5th December 1887. (Ricketson, 1987, p. 21) This set minimum standards of protection for all signatory countries. This Convention has been updated a number of times, and supplemented by other agreements. Copyright law for the United Kingdom is now supervised by the European Union, which is a signatory to the various agreements. It sends out periodic Directives to ensure than all member states are in compliance.

Subject to these international agreements, the main source of copyright law in the United Kingdom is The Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 as amended (CDPA). This replaced the Copyright Act 1956, which replaced the Copyright Act 1911. These earlier Acts remain applicable in the diminishing number of cases where a work was created at a time when they were still in force. Since the individual legal systems of the United Kingdom – England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland – are common law jurisdictions, it is for the courts to interpret the CDPA in any particular set of circumstances. The result is that judicial decisions are an important if subsidiary source of copyright law.

The general rule is that only original works can be subject to copyright protection. These are defined as works requiring that their author or authors exercised skill, labour and judgment in their production. (Ladbroke v William Hill [1964]) A musical work is defined as “a work consisting of music, exclusive of any words or action intended to be sung, spoken or performed with the music.” (CDPA 1988 s. (3)1) This definition was clarified by Mummery LJ as “combining sounds for listening to.” (Sawkins v Hyperion Records Ltd [2005]) A question arises in the case of an arrangement of music out of copyright protection. Mummery LJ adds (supra) that copyright will subsist where “some contribution to the sound of the music when performed, such as performing indications, tempo and performance practice indicators.” This builds on a series of earlier cases where it was decided that adaptations or the making of new performing editions might qualify for protection. Whatever the case, copyright in music only subsists once the work has been fixed in writing or otherwise. This includes performance or broadcast. (CDPA 1988 s. (3)2)

The duration of copyright depends on a number of factors. In the case of original, “pure” music published during the lifetime of its composer, copyright subsists for seventy years after the death of its composer. In the case of collaborative works, copyright subsists for seventy years after the death of the last collaborator. Therefore, the Venezuelan-French composer Reynaldo Hahn died in 1947. The score of his Marche Nuptiale (1905) came out of copyright at the end of 2017. Anyone can republish it in hard copy or on-line, or perform and record it, or arrange it, or put it to any use. However, his Prométhée Triomphant (1908) is a setting of words by Paul Reboux, who died in 1963. This work, as originally published, remains in copyright until the end of 2033. For works published after a composer’s death, copyright subsists for seventy years after publication. Therefore, Hahn’s Mélodies retrouvées, published in 1955, remain in copyright until the end of 2025

Where recordings are concerned, the law is more complex. Briefly stated, the CDPA initially provided for copyright protection for either fifty years after a recording was made, or, if published during that period, for fifty years from publication. The Copyright and Duration of Rights in Performances Regulations 2013 have now amended the CDPA, so that the copyright period has been extended to seventy years, so long as the recording was still in copyright – that is, recordings made before 1963 remain out of copyright, but everything since then is covered by the extension. Therefore, a recording of Hahn’s music made and published before 1948 is out of copyright – unless it is a digital remastering that allows it to pass the test of originality. (CDPA s. 5A(1)) A recording made and published in 2018, though his actual music is now out of copyright, will continue until 2088. But, if out of copyright, publication or broadcasting of those earlier Hahn recordings continued, until the end of 2018, to be governed by his estate’s retention of the copyright in the actual music.

The function of copyright law is to turn original works into temporary property. This is property that can be transferred by sale or inheritance. Its use can be allowed to others by a kind of licensing. Unlike with landed property, there is no central registry of ownership. though a copyright notice can be helpful in the event of confusion or disputes. It is instead a special form of personal property. Ownership is determined by examination of certain facts.

The CDPA provides a number of remedies for infringement of copyright, infringement being any unauthorised communication of a work that goes beyond “fair dealing.” These remedies are both civil and criminal. Civil remedies are: an injunction prohibiting further infringement; damages for any loss incurred due to the infringement; an account of any profit made by the infringer; the right to seize the infringing articles; delivery up by the infringer of the infringing articles. (CDPA s 96) To prevent concealment of infringing items or assets, an infringement action may be opened by an ex parte application for a civil search warrant, or a freezing order, or both.

These civil remedies under the CDPA have been supplemented by Directive 2004/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights. This requires member states of the European Union to make new laws if their civil procedures on the infringement of intellectual property rights are “unnecessarily complicated or costly, or entail unreasonable time-limits or unwarranted delays.”

The criminal offences created by the CDPA relating to infringement are comprehensive and severe. For example, infringing for sale or hire carries a maximum sentence of ten years imprisonment, or a fine, or both. (CDPA s 198(1)) Publishing an illicit recording of copyright music also carries a maximum sentence of ten years, or a fine, or both. (CDPA s. 198(2)) Anyone who deals in a service or device the purpose of which is to enable or facilitate the circumvention of effective technological copyright protections risks two years in prison, or a fine, or both. (CDPA 296 ZB). Generally, the CDPA creates a range of criminal offences dealing with almost every aspect of infringement.

A Balance of Competing Interests

So here with have both the law and the philosophical justifications of copyright. They provide an apparently solid structure of moral theory and legal fact to allow creative artists to benefit from their original creations. Of course, there are creative artists who want still more. The British singer Cliff Richard, for example, was not happy that his early recordings were going out of copyright in his old age. He campaigned for an extension to the fifty year duration originally laid down in the CDPA. He did much to achieve the 2013 extension to seventy years. Commenting on the extension, the British singer Mick Jagger said:

[The royalties] can extend their lives and the lives of their families who inherit their songs. (BBC, 2011)

Bjorn Ulvaeus of the Swedish group Abba agreed:

And the thousands of lesser-known musicians around Europe who are enriching our life and culture can get the fair reward in return for their work that they deserve. (BBC, 2011)

No doubt, these artists would be more pleased still if their copyrights were to last in perpetuity. Certainly, their publishers would be happy. In the United States, many copyright protections have been extended, under pressure from the Hollywood studios, to 95 years. (Masnick, 2012)

On the other side, however, is the competing public interest in the free availability of original works. If copyrights were perpetual, or if they lasted for a very long time, there is the chance that certain highly valuable original works would be withdrawn from the public. It might be, for example, that the great grandchildren of Mick Jagger will convert to a religion that regards his work as abhorrent. They might then withdraw it from the public, and even destroy it. Therefore, copyright law seeks to strike a balance between competing interests.

Here we come to the problem that is the main subject matter of this essay. Even as it emerged in its fullest development, this structure of copyright law was being undermined by new technology.

The Digital Revolution

Copyright infringement has existed as long as there have been copyright laws. The original laws were made in the light of the philosophical arguments given above, and then developed in the light of perceived breaches of these laws. But, in the case of copyrights in recorded music, there were technological limits to the amount of infringement.

The first of these was the nature of the recording process. Until about 1980, both recording and publishing were analogue. Music was laid down on a medium as a continuous wave. It was an expensive skill to keep the ratio of noise to signal low in the initial recording, and then expensive to keep the rise of noise to signal acceptable in the transfer from master tape to vinyl record or plastic tape. (Mellor, 2006) Any further copy from tape to tape or record to tape introduced still further noise – either increased tape hiss or rumble from a turntable or noise from dust or imperfections in the grooves. Recordings of broadcasts suffered a similar degradation. Given that even low-grade recording equipment was expensive by modern standards, the technical quality of pirated recordings was not usually of merchantable quality. Added to this, the cost of cassette tapes and packaging, and storage and transport costs, placed a floor on the prices of pirated music. This limited demand.

The second limit was to supply. Even low-scale piracy meant the need for relatively large and unconcealable equipment and storage of pirated media. This made it easy if expensive to enforce copyright. As said above, an action for infringement might begin with a civil search order – known in the first instance as an Anton Piller order. (Anton Piller KG v Manufacturing Processes Ltd & Ors [1975]) This was expected to discover and enable the seizure of infringing articles. After this, a case might go to trial or to summary judgment, or just be settled out of court. It was impossible for organisations like the  British Phonographic Industry to find and stop every supplier of pirated music. But it was possible for continuous and firm action – combined with the technical shortcomings of infringing copies – to keep some lid on music piracy.

That was then. By 1980s, most master tapes had gone digital. That is, music was laid down as a series of ones and zeros. Noise in the recording studio could still contaminate the sound, but there could be no further degradation until the digital signal was converted to analogue for publishing on vinyl or tape. With the introduction of the compact disk, the analogue window was closed. Those ones and zeros could be passed without degradation from recording studio to home playback devices.

The first effect was a boom in sales of recorded music, as people scrapped their entire analogue collections and started again. The compact disk became “the fastest-growing home entertainment product in history.” (Lynskey, 2015) The longer term effect was disastrous to the whole existing model of musical copyright exploitation.

By 1995, CD-ROM drives were standard to entry-level personal computers. It became possible to rip the music from compact disks and store it on hard drives in various compressed on uncompressed formats, and with little or no loss of original quality.

By 2000, CD-burners had replaced DC-ROM drives in home computers. It was now possible not only to rip the music from commercial compact disks, but to burn it to new disks, while leaving the commercial disks undamaged – again without any loss of original quality. Or it was possible to rip ten or more commercial disks, convert the music to compressed mp3 format, and burn everything to a single disk – again with little or no loss of original quality.

Again by about 2000, almost everyone in the developed world had some access to the Internet, and download speeds were moving far above the 56kbs that had been thought sufficient for sending and receiving text e-mails. People began uploading vast quantities for ripped music to Usenet groups for anyone else to download.

The big step came in 1999 with the launch of Napster. Shaun Fanning, its creator, revealed the possibility of peer-to-peer sharing – that is, to let members of a network hold archives of ripped music on their own hard drives and make it available to all other members. By March 2000, the Napster “community” already number twenty million. (Lamont, 2013)

Shortly after, the first portable mp3 players appeared on the market.

Napster was never the only peer-to-peer sharing network, and there have been other ways to access pirated music. These ways continue to proliferate, and the rest of this essay could easily be taken up with an overview of what can be done. But it is enough to say that all the technical constraints on copyright infringement hat existed before the digital revolution have fallen to the ground. Recorded music is no longer copied but cloned in its original quality, or close to that. The tools of infringement are nothing more than the normal tools for using home computers and the Internet.

The consequence of this revolution was a sudden and sustained collapse in both sales and revenue for the recorded music industry. This has happened in all its territories. But here is a chart, produced by the British Phonographic Industry (Tschmuck, 2017) showing what happened in the United Kingdom between 1975 and 2016:

Source: Tschmuck, 2017

We see here a strong growth in sales of recorded music from the introduction of the compact disk in the early 1980s. Revenues peak in 2001, and go thereafter into a rapid and sustained decline. By 2015, Revenue from all recorded music in hard or soft copy are at their lowest in twenty years. There is a slight increase after 2015, which will be discussed in due course. For the rest, it is not hard to join cause and effect.

Copyright on the Defensive

The first response of the music recording companies was an expanded use of the existing law. The Recording Industry Associates of America (RIAA) and the  British Phonographic Industry both went after the sharers. In the United State alone between 2003 and 2007, the RIAA brought roughly 30,000 cases. While earlier infringement actions had been brought against people who could easily be depicted as professional thieves of intellectual property, most of these 30,000 were ordinary people, usually caught in random scans of sharing sites. Many of these cases ended in settlements or summary judgments for derisory amounts. Only one went to full trial and was won. (Kravets, 2009)

So far as success is concerned, the table of American sales given below speaks for itself. (Digital Music News, 2011)

Source: http://digitalmusicnews.com/stories/021711disruption

The main British response has been the Digital Economy Act 2010 (DEA). The Government described this as necessary to curb on-line copyright infringement, and as “proportionate to the harm caused to UK industry.” (BIS, 2010, p. 32) The DEA, plus a Provisional Code drafted by Ofcom, the regulator named in the Act, requires the main British Internet service providers to notify their customers when reported by rights holders for copyright infringement. They are required to keep records of the real identities of their customers, and, if these are suspected of otherwise anonymous on-line copyright infringement, to notify them that they have been accused. They are further required, on court order and after three notifications, to disclose the real identities of their infringing customers to the rights holder. (Ofcom, 2010, para. 3.15)

Apart from this measure on the “demand side,” the main “supply side” measure used so far has been the CDPA as amended to include s. 97A:

The High Court (in Scotland, the Court of Session) shall have power to grant an injunction against a service provider, where that service provider has actual knowledge of another person using their service to infringe copyright.

This allows rights holders to force Internet service providers to block access to offending websites and services.

Otherwise, the Government is trying to persuade other countries to tighten and to enforce their own laws against copyright infringement. (IPO, 2016, p. 22)

The wider problem with all this is that the digital revolution has not been just about the development of new technologies. It has also created a shift of cultural paradigm. The world before about 2000 was “information poor.” It was relatively hard to find music. A consumer had to go to a shop, or buy a physical product by mail order. Or a consumer had to wait for something to be played on television or the radio. A copy might then be made, but these were relatively hard to share with others. The rise of the Internet has made everything available, all the time, to everyone. Having to buy music is increasingly seen as an unreasonable burden.

An increasing array of personalised, networked, convergent and mobile media products and services means the social environment is changing the contexts of Internet use, with online media becoming more integral to all spheres of life, blurring the boundaries between home and school and between public and private life. (Mansell & Steinmueller, 2011, p. 10)

It is common knowledge that people can use virtual private networks to hide their activity from Internet service providers. There are parts of the world – Russia, for example – beyond the influence of any Western government. (Export.gov, 2017) It is also common knowledge that infringing material can be disguised from automated searches by the enforcement authorities.

The culture has changed. People like the idea of free music. Free music is available. If they ever did, people no longer see copyright infringement as disreputable. There is no reason to suppose that, even if the copyright laws could be properly enforced again, music revenues would grow back to their 2001 level.

[W]e cannot rewind history… we cannot create, by fiat, a world in which people who infringe suddenly become unaware of the possibility of exchanging infringing MP3 or other audiovisual files as an alternative to paying for them. Nor can we rewind history to eliminate the further proliferation of technological means to exchange files through social networks (including those formed online). Thus, estimates provided by the creative industry in support of its claims of revenue likely to be recovered as a result of legislative measures such as the DEA in the UK, and similar legislation being introduced in other countries, are simply not reliable. (Mansell & Steinmueller, 2011, pp. 14-15)

A Fresh Start?

Copyright law evolved as a balancing act between interests in the light of certain philosophical claims, and in a world where enforcement was broadly possible. That world is passing away. A relevant analogy is the enforcement of real property rights in the American West. Before 1880, crop farmers had legally-enforceable rights in the land they had settled. The Anglo-American law of real property applied in full. In practice, however, the high cost of fencing off their land left farmers at risk of uncompensated damage from damage by the livestock of cattle farmers. Investment and productivity remained low. Then cheap barbed wire fencing became available. After this, agricultural investment and productivity rose sharply. (Hornbeck, 2010)

What we are now seeing is something like this, but in reverse. However defined on paper, given whatever enforcement means on paper, laws are only effective if they can be enforced in practice. If it cannot be enforced, a law might as well not exist.

This has not been the end of the recorded music industry. Copyright has not been the only system for ensuring that creative artists and their associates get paid. Until long into the nineteenth century, there was the patronage of the wealthy and there were subscription models, whereby members of the public could pay in advance for a publication. These models of payment tended to fade away with the rise of copyright. But they remain possible, and there are other models that are suited to the age of the digital revolution.

In 2003, Apple launched its own legal download service – the iTunes Music Store. For a few years, it sales rose sharply. (Mansell & Steinmueller, 2011, p. 22) Other legal download services followed. After clinging too long to the compact disk technology that seems to have reached the end of its product lifecycle, rights holders now offer paid download services that combine an absence of security problems with extra features such as exclusive tracks, album art and gift certificates.

Then there has been the rise of music streaming via platforms like YouTube. Music is offered free, but is attached to advertisements for physical goods, or other goods or services that can only be had for money. Or there are paid subscription models. In terms of revenue, the market share of streamed music, paid and “free,” in the United Kingdom rose from 12 per cent in 2010 to 63.6 per cent in 2016. (Tschmuck, 2017)

It is too early to say whether these services are a workable model for the long term. But it seems to be advertising revenue for streaming that contributed to the sudden increase, noted above, of revenues after 2015. Here is a chart (Tschmuck, 2017) showing recent trends in the United Kingdom:

Source: After BPI annual reports, 2004-2016.

In conclusion, my answer to the question that inspired this essay is no – the current legislative framework on copyright in the United Kingdom is not sufficient to protect the interests of right holders. But this may not matter. Music is still produced, and those engaged in its production and sale still make money. And that is what really matters.

 

Bibliography

Acts of Parliament

Copyright and Duration of Rights in Performances Regulations 2013

Digital Economy Act 2010

Directive 2004/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the enforcement of intellectual property rights

Cases

Anton Piller KG v Manufacturing Processes Ltd & Ors [1975] EWCA Civ 12

Ladbroke v William Hill [1964] 1 All ER 465

Sawkins v Hyperion Records Ltd [2005] EWCA Civ 565; [2005] 1 WLR 3281

 

General

BBC. (2011, May 12). Rock veterans win copyright fight. Retrieved April 22, 2018, from http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/entertainment-arts-14882146

BIS. (2010). Online Infringement of Copyright (Initial Obligations) Cost-Sharing. London: Department for Business, Information and Skills.

Digital Music News. (2011, February 17). Disruption. Digital Music News.

Export.gov. (2017). Russia – 5-Protection of Property Rights. Retrieved April 24, 2018, from https://www.export.gov/article?id=Russia-Protection-of-Property-Rights

Fisher, W. (2001). Theories of Intellectual Property. In S. R. Munzer (Ed.), New Essays in the Legal and Political Theory of Property. Harvard: Harvard University Press.

Gordon, W. J. (1993). A Property Right In Self-Expression: Equality And Individualism In The Natural Law of Intellectual Property. Yale Law Journal, 102.

Helprin, M. (2007, May 20). A Great Idea Lives Forever. Shouldn’t Its Copyright? New York Times.

Hornbeck, R. (2010). Barbed Wire: Property Rights and Agricultural Development. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 125(2).

IPO (Intellectual Property Office). (2016). Protecting Creativity, Supporting Innovation: IP Enforcement 2020. London: HMSO.

Kravets, D. (2009, April 08). File Sharing Lawsuits at a Crossroads, after 5 years of RIAA litigation. Wired.

Lamont, T. (2013, February 24). Napster: the day the music was set free. The Observer.

Landes, W. M., & Posner, R. A. (1989). An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law. Journal of Legal Studies, 18.

Locke, J. (1690). Second Treatise on Government.

Lynskey, D. (2015, May 28). How the compact disc lost its shine . The Guardian.

Mansell, R., & Steinmueller, W. E. (2011). Copyright Infringement Online: The Case of the Digital Economy Act Judicial Review in the United Kingdom. London: LSE Research online. Retrieved from http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/36433/

Masnick, M. (2012, June 06). Copyright Extension: A Way To Protect Hollywood From Having To Compete With The Past. Tech Dirt.

Mellor, D. (2006, June 26). Noise – the curse of analog recording. The Audio Class Newsletter.

Netanel, N. W. (1996). Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society. Yale Law Journal, 106.

Newman, E. (1933). The Life of Richard Wagner (Vol. 1). New York: Alfred A. Knopf.

Ofcom. (2010). Online Infirngement of Copyright and the Digital Economy Act 2010: Draft Initial Obligations Code. London: Ofcom.

Ricketson, S. (1987). The Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works 1886–1986. London: Centre for Commercial Law Studies, Queen Mary College/Kluwer.

Shapiro, D., Patridge, M., McCafferty, E., Herstin, H., Gupta, S., & Leveillee, C. (2012, November 09). The Invention of Compact Discs. Retrieved 04 22, 2018, from faculty.tuck.dartmouth.edu/…/dup-1EIS_Main_Project_Compact_Disc_Paper.pdf

Tschmuck, P. (2017, July 30). The UK Recorded Music Market in a Long-Term Perspective, 1975-2016. Music Business Research.

United States. (1788). Constitution of the United States.

 

 

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